Abstract-There exists a large number of suggestions for how to measure security, with different goals and objectives. The application areas range from business management and organizational systems to large software systems. The approaches may be theoretical, technical, administrative or practical. In many cases the goal is to find a single overall metric of security. Given that security is a complex and multifaceted property, we believe that there are fundamental problems to find such an overall metric. Thus, we suggest a framework for security metrics that is based on a number of system attributes taken from the security and the dependability disciplines. We start out from the traditional decomposition of security into three main aspects ("CIA") and include a set of dependability attributes. The reason for this is that security and dependability largely reflect the same basic system feature and are partly overlapping. We then regroup those attributes according to an existing conceptual system model and propose metrication methods in accordance. We suggest that there should be metrics related to protective attributes, to behavioural attributes and to system correctness. We also discuss the relation between these types of metrics. We are convinced that this approach will facilitate making quantitative assessment of the concept of combined security and dependability and that it would also improve our understanding of these important system properties.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we will suggest a novel security metrication approach that is based on a combined security/dependability model [15] . There have been several previous attempts to present various frameworks and directions in the security metrication research field. The first comprehensive attempt towards structuring the security measurement and metrication research was carried out at the WIISSR workshop [27] . A generic concept for InformationSecurity *, denoted (IS)* was defined in the workshop to avoid confusion in terminology. IS* was intended to cover all different terms in the area, e.g. metric, measure, score, rating, rank, or assessment result. Moreover, it identified criteria for assessment of Information Assurance (IA) metrics. A significant outcome of the workshop was its proposal for the three main tracks for security metrication, i.e. Technical, Organizational and Operational metrics.
Following this proposal, other researchers tried to add more categories with respect to various metrication applications, objectives and goals. Vaughn et al. [17] proposed two main categories for Information Assurance measurement: Technical Target of Assessment and Organizational security. From the Organizational perspective, NIST 800-26 [21] and Savola [3] proposed three main tracks for security metrication: Technical, Operational and Management. However, NIST and Savola's technical categories were not specified for any particular target of assessment, but rather for assessment of technical security controls in organizations. NIST 800-55 [19] , [20] offered another categorization for metrication suggesting Implementation, Effectiveness and Efficiency as well as Business Impact as the main metrication categories. Other well-known security metrics approaches have been suggested by Pironti [7] , Savola [4] , ISO/IEC 27004 [26] , Payne [30] , CISWG [10] and NISTIR 7564 [22] each of them for different systems and applications. There have not been many attempts to model-based security metrication. Savola [5] proposed a Security Metrics Objective Segment model, which is a taxonomy model including five levels for the main security metrics objective segments.
In this paper we start out from a conceptual security/dependability model that describes a system's interaction with its environment via the system boundaries [15] . The model identifies the main aspects and attributes for security/dependability and clarifies the relation between malicious environmental influence and the service level delivered to the users of the system. Based on the model we regroup the traditional security and dependability attributes into protective attributes, behavioural attributes and correctness. The overall goal of the paper is to provide a generic approach for model based security metrication that we hope can enhance the understanding of model based metrication.
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In the following, section II gives a brief summary of traditional security and dependability attributes. Section III describes the security model. The three defence lines in the model are described in section IV as well as the causality chain of impairments. In section V the two main approaches toward model-based security metrication are suggested. Section VI discusses the implication of causality and latency on behavioural metrication and draws attention towards the binary modelling assumption used in the paper. Finally we conclude the paper in section VII.
II. TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY AND

DEPENDABILITY
In this section we give a brief description of the different attributes of security and dependability 1 Security refers to the system's ability to prevent unauthorized access or handling of information and to its ability to withstand hostile interaction or attacks against system assets such as data, hardware or software. Security is normally decomposed into three different aspects: confidentiality, integrity and availability [8] , loosely called "the CIA". Confidentiality is the ability of the computing system to prevent disclosure of information to unauthorized parties. Integrity is the ability of the computer system to prevent unauthorized withholding, modification or deletion. Availability is the ability of the system to in fact deliver its service. More formally, it can be described as the probability that the system will be available, or ready for use, at a certain instant in time. Sometimes other characteristics are also suggested as security aspects, e.g. authentication and non-repudation, e.g. see [6] , [9] .
according to a common understanding.
Dependability, on the other hand, is decomposed into the attributes: availability, reliability, safety, integrity and maintainability [2] . Here, reliability is a characteristic that reflects the probability that the system will deliver its service under specified conditions for a stated period of time. Safety denotes the system's ability to fail in such a way that catastrophic consequences are avoided. Thus, safety is reliability with respect to catastrophic failures. (Please note that there exist several other definitions of safety, e.g. in the software development area.) Availability and integrity are defined as above. Finally, the maintainability attribute denotes the system's ability to undergo modifications and repairs. It must be noted that the original dependability fault assumption was that of non-malicious, "stochastic" or "random" faults, such as those resulting from a component failure, rather than deliberate, malicious security faults (attacks). Such arbitrary faults might be internal faults, occurring (seemingly) spontaneously within the system, as well as external faults. Nowadays both non-malicious and malicious faults are considered in existing models. However, because of the difficulty of making a formal or mathematical treatment of deliberate, malicious faults, most research so far has been done on dependability with a random fault assumption.
III.
A PROPOSED SYSTEM SECURITY MODEL This section gives a brief description of the system model for security and dependability attributes originally proposed in [15] . Once again, for simplicity, we use the term security to denote the combined concept of security and dependability. Our approach is that the security of a system should be understood in relation to its environment, in terms of system input and output. First, we define the system that we are considering, the object system. It is important to clarify the boundaries of the object system, since the subsequent discussion of the security model is based upon a welldefined system. The object system may be arbitrarily complex: a single computer, a computer network or possibly a whole organisation, including people. Note that by studying a larger system more of the potential problems are "embedded" into the system as internal or insider problems. These problems are not directly addressed in the paper. Conceptually, the object system interacts with the environment in two basically different ways. The object system either receives an input from the environment, or delivers an output to the environment. See figure 1 . The input to the system is denoted environmental influence. The environmental influence may be of many different kinds. The type of interaction we are interested in here is that which involves fault introduction. Malicious, external faults, i.e., attacks, are particularly interesting. Such faults originate from a threat in the environment. The threat may be a human being, a natural phenomenon or another computer system, among other things. The threat launches an attack towards the system. The attack will be successful if it can exploit a vulnerability in the system so that an intrusion results. The presence of the intrusion can be regarded as an error (or erroneous state) in the system. Note that vulnerability is a passive feature of the system as opposed to an error. The error may (or may not) propagate and lead to a system failure. This depends on the implementation of the system, how it is operated, what defensive mechanisms are active etc. Thus, there is a causal relationship between those impairments: fault/attack, error/intrusion and failure. Further details on impairments and their interaction can be found in [14] and [2] .
We will now discuss the relation between these impairments and security aspects. Since faults are detrimental to the system, we seek to design the system such that the introduction of faults is prevented. We denote this ability integrity. It is thus a protective attribute of security. It is our opinion that the integrity attribute is in effect the essence of security. The conceptual output from the object system is the system behaviour. The system behaviour includes the notion of service delivery to the USER(s). As originally observed in [11] there are two fundamentally different types of users: authorized users (called USERs) and unauthorized users (called NON-USERs). This in itself might be evident, but the importance of the observation lies in the fact that the required system behaviour is different for USERS and NON-USERS. Thus, the behavioural attributes are of two types: delivery-of-service and denial-of-service. The desired (and preferably specified) delivery-of-service to the USER is described by the availability and reliability aspect. It should be noted that identifiying exactly who are the USERS and who are the NON-USERs is dependent to each system and its specifications. For instance, a NON-USER could also include authorized users with limited access or service levels denying them to use particular services. Reliability is a behavioural attribute, which in this way is closely related to availability. The difference is that whereas reliability only considers the operational time of the system before it fails, availability considers repeated periods of function and non-function (failed state), where the transitions between these periods are failures and repair respectively. See figure 1 . Another desired quality is that the system shall have an ability to deny service, denoted denial-of-service, to the NON-USER. (This is marked as a bold "stop-bar" in figure 1.) Note the duality of these concepts. The normal and preferred situation for the USER, i.e. that the service is indeed delivered, implies a failure with respect to the NON-USER and vice versa. If the service denied relates to information it is described by the behavioural attribute confidentiality. In case it relates to other services we use the word exclusivity [18] . Thus, exclusivity is the ability of the system to deny any unauthorized use of system service. Finally, the safety attribute introduces another aspect of system behaviour. It models the severity of a failure. In its most primitive, binary form it maps failures into catastrophic and non-catastrophic failures. The "degree of catastrophe", i.e. the distinction between these two cases, is to be defined by the USER. All failures that are regarded as catastrophic, whether they represent a failure of delivery-ofservice or a failure of denial-of-service, are represented by the safety attribute. Thus, safety failures represent subsets of reliability/availability failures or confidentiality/exclusivity failures. An example of a "catastrophic failure" is a failure in the drive-by-wire system of a car that would lead to an accident, with possible casualties. Another example is the
Figure1. An integrated model of security and dependability unauthorized disclosure of secret, military information that would have disastrous consequences in case of war.
The maintainability attribute has no place in our model, as it does not describe an operational system-environmental interaction. Maintainability rather represents the efficiency of the implementation of a security mechanism that is aimed at making the system security design better (more secure, reliable, safe, etc).
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
A. Three basic methods to avoid failures
Considering the above causal relation between various impairments, we can see that there are three basic ways to break the causal chain of unwanted events and to counter the propagation of impairments. See figure 1. The basic causal chain is attack -error -failure. We observe that the attack, i.e. external fault, originates from the environmental threat. The error is the result of insufficient protection against the attack. Finally, the failure occurs since the error was permitted to propagate to the system output. The obvious conclusion is that defence methods could be applied accordingly. We name them threat reduction, boundary protection and recovery. Threat reduction methods focus on the threat. These methods aim to reduce or eliminate the threat, i.e. make it less probable that an attack is launched towards the system. An example of threat reduction would be legal measures. If the threat is a human attacker the prospect of facing a jail sentence would most probably decrease her motivation to launch attacks as compared to if this act was legal. Boundary protection is the set of methods that protect the system from malicious external influence. An example would be authentication, which aims at refusing access for unauthorized entities.
Recovery methods aim at eliminating errors inside system boundaries before they produce a failure. For internal faults this is the only available defence methodology. An antivirus tool is an obvious example of a recovery mechanism. A virus that has entered the system represents an error. It is well known that many viruses will not become visible to the USER until at some later occasion. If they can be found and deleted before they have caused a failure or any other nonrecoverable damage, a successful recovery has taken place. In order to counter an attack, i.e. to avoid a system failure, only one of these methods needs to be effective. On the other hand careful security work requires that all three types of methods are used at the same time and are continuously active. The flow of attacks may be large and unpredictable and we need to "filter out" attacks as early as possible in the chain, hoping that none will slip through. It is also recommendable to update the methods continuously in order to cope with the continuous "progress" on the attack side.
B. The causality perspective
A further benefit of the model is that it clearly exhibits the causal chain of impairments, from attack to system failure.
The attack is launched by a threat. If successful, there is an intrusion, which produces an unwanted system state of some kind. The unwanted system state is an internal system error. There are three different outcomes of the system error. First, it may be immediately removed by some recovery mechanism. Second, it may be latent in the system for some time, before it propagates to the output. The latency time may be short. It may also last for very long time periods, i.e. many years, whether for operational reasons or because this was the intention of the attacker. See [1] . Third, the error may propagate through the system without any noticeable delay and directly cause a system failure. It is normally possible to observe that a failure has occurred, e.g. by the USER, as it affects the delivered service. The above reasoning shows how an attack may cause an error that propagates to cause a failure. On the other hand, it also shows that a successful attack may cause an error but that this error will not lead to a failure, i.e. it will not affect the system service. Therefore, insufficient integrity -a traditional "security" problem -could lead to reduced reliability, availability or safety -a traditional "dependability" problem 2 In another situation the service delivered by the system may fail as a result of some (apparently) random error within the system, e.g. a component failure.
. Insufficient integrity could also lead to impaired confidentiality or exclusivity. Thus, the service delivered by the system may be impaired by attacks on the system, but the relation between the attacks and the service is complicated and dependent on system internal factors.
In summary, a system failure may be caused by an attack, but may also be due to some random event. Or, taking the opposite view, a successful attack may or may not lead to a failure. If it leads to a failure, there may be considerable delay between the attack and the resulting failure.
V. SECURITY METRICS BASED ON THE SYSTEM MODEL
A. Defining Two Different Types of Security Metrics
The conceptual system model presented in section III suggests that security metrics could be defined according to the suggested two types of system-environment interaction, i.e. input from the environment and output to the environment. Thus, we could define protective security metrics (referring to the input) and behavioural security metrics (referring to the output). As already noted, we believe that protective security captures the most important characteristics of security, and in particular the notion of protection. Consequently, it could be launched as a new security definition. Behavioural security is dependent on protective security and in this respect it is secondary to it. One could chose to call behavioural security something else, e.g. dependability or trustworthiness. It should also be possible to define some kind of internal metrics that would reflect the correctnesss of the system. It could be discussed whether correctness is really a security attribute or not. We have chosen to handle it as a separate concept as it does not directly interact with the environment. In the following we will define and discuss these kinds of metrics in some detail.
B. Protective Security Metrics
1) How could protective security be measured? Protective metrics should assess the extent to which the system is able to protect itself against unwanted external influence, e.g. external attacks. Normally, we assume that there is some kind of malicious intent involved in this influence, but you could also think of situations when the unwanted input is the result of e.g. a mistake made by an "ordinary" USER. We do not attempt to suggest a more exact definition for this case, as it will not affect the overall reasoning or treatment of the situation. There are at least two different approaches to measure protective security. The first one is called system-related and refers to the system's ability to protect itself in terms of protection mechanisms. The other one is called threatrelated. It measures security in terms of the effort an attacker has to expend in order to make an intrusion. These two approaches are detailed below.
2) Metrics based on security protection mechanisms
As mentioned in the preceding section, one approach toward protective security measurement is to measure security based on the three fundamental methods to avoid failures in a system ("defence lines"): threat reduction, boundary protection and (internal) recovery. We realize that there are available mechanisms for the defence against intrusions for each of these methods and in this case the metrics would assess the strength of the corresponding mechanisms under the assumption that the stronger the mechanisms are, the better the system is protected. If the ultimate goal is to avoid a system (output) failure the combined strength of all three types of mechanisms would have to be considered .The corresponding measure would also based on the combined strength of all involved security mechanisms it is not a priori evident how to calculate the combined strength. The protective security will not necessarily be higher if stronger mechanisms are involved. This is due to the fact that the protective strength rather lies in the fact that there are no weak mechanisms. Or in other words, there should be no vulnerabilities or "holes" in the system in order for it to be well protected. Therefore, it is a non-trivial task to find a method for such a combination of the effect of a number of protective mechanisms.
3) Using attacker effort as a protective security metric The second way to measure security is to base the metric upon the effort that has to be expended by an attacker in order to make a breach into the system, i.e. to compromise integrity. This approach was first proposed by Littlewood et al. [36] and this work has been extended in [16] , [23] , [37] . The idea is that an effort-based measure should be representative of all environment factors having effect on the attacker's effort to make a successful intrusion. The main contributing factors of effort are the time it takes to carry out the attack and the skill level of the attacker. However, many other parameters have to be considered: population of attackers, attack space size, reward effect on attackers' behaviour, system feedback to the attacker, attackers' willingness, etc. Here, reward is the benefit experienced by the attacker if the attack is successful. This is a complicated factor as reward need not be something tangible, such as money, but mere satisfaction of achieving a goal. A further complication is that the attacker may experience reward also for partially successful attacks or even for unsuccessful attacks.
4) How to find an effort metric in practice
In the above section we discussed which environmental parameters that an effort metric should reflect and in particular the attacker behaviour. However, it is probably infeasible to really measure all those parameters in practice. Instead we have to rely upon representative samples. An attempt to make a real measurement by performing supervised attack experiments was reported in [13] . This work showed that it is in principle possible to find a metric for effort. In this simplified case the metric was Mean Time To Intrusion 3 It should be noted that the experiment above was carried out with a population of attackers, intended to reflect a "normal" attacker. This situation should not be confused with so-called Red team penetration tests, in which a number of very knowledgeable attackers carry out standard attacks exploiting known vulnerabilities to check that the system has been properly patched from a security viewpoint.
(MTTI), i.e. the average time used by an attacker to make an intrusion. It was also shown that, given certain pre-conditions the MTTI metric could be combined with a MTTF metric derived from random errors, such as component errors. However, the practical metric from such an experiment has limited applicability and does only reflect the security of the used system at the time of measurement. It remains to be demonstrated how to make measurements that are generally applicable and could serve to make predictions of the security of other similar systems.
5) Problems with the attacker effort metric
One problem with effort-based metrics is that there may be an interaction between some of, or even all of, the factors mentioned in section V.B.3. For instance the reward gained by the attacker has great impact on her willingness to launch further attacks. In the general case it is not clear exactly how this influence would manifest itself. A positive reward might spur the attacker to further attacks, but you could also think of situations when attack success makes her less tempted to continue. A more general problem is how to handle exploits, i.e. programs that take advantage of the existence of known vulnerabilities or attacks. It is often possible to download those programs from internet web sites and launch them towards the target system. In that case, the attacker´s skill level is not required to be high. Neither would it take very long to carry out the attack. The only problem might be that the exploit would have to be adapted to the actual version of the operating system in question. The interpretation of this situation is that the relevant amount of effort is expended in designing the exploit, but when the exploit is published and downloaded by the attacker, she takes advantage of the work done by somebody else more or less "free of charge". Thus, this effort would not show up directly in a measurement. On the other hand, it would mean that the attacker now has more powerful means of help available than otherwise. It is unclear exactly how to handle this situation.
C. Behavioural Security Metrics
1) How could behavioural security be measured? Behavioural security metrics are proposed to quantify the behaviour of the system w.r.t its output environment. These metrics assess the service-level delivered to the USER of the system. More accurately, they quantify the behaviour of the system w.r.t its USERs and NON-USERs. The system is expected to successfully deliver its service to its USERs, while successfully deny service to its NON-USERs. As suggested by the model, the behavioural security attributes 4 It must also be noted that the existing behavioural metrics come from the traditional dependability area. Therefore, calling them behvioural security metrics may be somewhat controversial.
are: reliability, availability, safety, confidentiality and exclusivity. There are already a large number of metrics suggested for reliability, availability and safety, but not so for confidentiality or exclusivity.
2) Behavioural security metrics
In this section we shortly describe existing or proposed metrics for behavioural security attributes. Reliabilty is the expected time duration the system is operating before it fails in delivering its service. The common metric for this purpose is Mean-Time-to-Failure (MTTF). Availability is closely related to reliability in the sense that they both quantify the behaviour of the system w.r.t resistance to failure. However, availability gives an assessment the repeated periods of operation and nonoperation of the system rather than one individual operational period. More generally, reliability measures the continuity of delivery of correct service or in other words (mean) time to failure. Availability on the other hand, measures to which degree, often expressed in percent, the system is capable of delivering its service taken into account the alternation of service delivery and non-delivery [32] . A common steady-state availability metric is calculated as: Mean Time To Failure/ (Mean Time To failure + Mean Time to Repair)). See [28] , [32] , [33] .
Safety evaluates the absence of catastrophic consequences on the USERs and the environment in case of a failure [32] . In other words, it quantifies the severity of the consequences of a system failure into either catastrophic or noncatastrophic. It is up to the USER to define a consequence level, above which the failure is regarded as catastrophic. Safety is related to reliability in the sense that it quantifies the subset of failures that are regarded as catastrophic, i.e. where a discontinued service delivery leads to a catastrophe. Here, it is implicit that the discontinued service delivery is with respect to the authorized USER. In a corresponding way safety can be related to confidentiality. This is in a situation when a service is indeed delivered to the NON-USER, i.e. a discontinued denial-of-service occurs and this leads to a catastrophe. A common metric for safety is Mean Time to Catastrophic Failure (MTTCF) and it is defined in analogy with Mean Time To Failure. See [28] , [34] . Confidentiality is the ability of the system to keep sensitive information confidential with respect to NON-USERs. There are not many suggestions in literature on how to measure confidentiality. However, one of the approaches to confidentiality metrication is to derive behavioural measures from traditional reliability methods, such as Markov modelling. Jonsson et al. [13] proposed performance measures on user-specified service levels i.e. operational or failed. They discussed that certain levels could be related to confidentiality degradation or confidentiality failures. Hence, Mean Time To Degradation was suggested both as reliability metric (w.r.t the USERs) and confidentiality metrics (w.r.t NON-USERs). The authors proposed a vectorized measure reflecting the status of the service levels defined for the system. As there have been little research on confidentiality metrication we suggest that further steps should be taken in this direction of behavioural security metrication. The concept of exclusivity is not widely used and we know of no suggestions for how to measure it. However, it seems plausible that an approach similar to that of confidentiality could be adopted.
D. Correctness Metrics 1) How could correctness be measured?
Correctness should be assessed with respect to the internal state of the system. This means that we have to define a state that could serve as a template for "full" correctness and then measure the actual deviation from this state. However, there are several problems to define correctness in practice. For one thing we have to distinguish between correctness of the data in the system and the system itself, i.e. the programs, mechanisms, hardware, etc. It should be possible, even if not trivial, to define what is meant by correct data, for example in a database, but it seems harder to define correctness for the system itself. If we could find a good correctness definition, the next step would be to find the degree of incorrectness, i.e. the deviation from the correct state. We are not aware of any research attempts to address this problem and we will not make any such suggestions in this paper. We limit ourselves to observe that a correctness metric will be needed to make the set of system-related metrics complete.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Implication of the chain of impairments on behavioural metrics As we mentioned in "The causality perspective" section (IV.B), different attributes of security are closely connected to each other. We identified a causal chain of impairments for the protective, correctness and behavioural attributes from the attack to the system failure. In this section we discuss the effect of the chain of impairments in security metrication. We realize that the behavioural attributes of the system are dependent upon the environmental threats, protection mechanisms and the internal recovery mechanisms. The stronger a threat reduction mechanism is the lesser becomes the threat towards the system and consequently the number and/or strength of potential attacks. Further, the better a boundary protection mechanism is, the higher the integrity is, the lesser would the number of internal errors in the system be. Finally, the better a recovery mechanism is the less probable is a system failure. As a conclusion, the behavioural attributes, e.g. reliability, vary with respect to the strength of the three defence lines in the system in such a way that a better defence will lead to increased reliability. Thus, the better the defence mechanisms are the higher becomes the reliability of the system. Therefore, higher security (integrity) will lead to higher reliability. The same reasoning is of course also valid for availability, safety, confidentiality and exclusivity.
B. Implications of latency on behavioural metrics
In the preceding section we discussed the influence of the various defence line mechanisms on the behavioural attributes and metrics. The implicit assumption was that a particular mechanism would break the chain of impairments and thus improve system behaviour. For example, the boundary protection or recovery mechanisms can stop attacks that would otherwise have passed and caused failures. In this section we will deal with the latency aspect. Error latency is the delay between the introduction of an error into the system, e.g. an intrusion, and the resulting failure. The latency is mainly a function of system operation and/or of recovery mechanisms. The latency may be short or long and in the case of infinite latency there will be no failure and the system behaviour will never be affected. Now, by applying the same reasoning as in the previous section we realize that latency will also affect behavioural metrics. The longer the error latency the better is the system behaviour, i.e. the better the reliability, etc. The conclusion of this is that security (integrity) failures are related to for example reliability failures, but that there is no direct correspondence.
C. The binary assumption for impairments
It must be noted that throughout this paper we have implicitly applied a binary model of our impairments. For example, we have assumed that the system is functioning or non-functioning, i.e. that there is a failure or there is no failure. Is is obvious that this in many cases is an oversimplification. In reality the system will not fail completely, but only to a certain degree. It may continue to work but with degraded service delivery or degraded performance. This aspect is encompassed by the attribute performability. See [34] and references therein. There have been a few studies on behavioural metrics considering the degradation approach. In [12] a practical dependability metric for degradable computer systems with non-exponential degradation was proposed. The dependability attributes covered by this approach were: reliability, safety and performability. The authors used Markov modelling with phase-type assumption to enhance assessment of systems with non-exponential and timedependent degradation. These types of studies have a good potential of being applied in behavioural security metrication. We have also used the binary assumption on the input side in that we say that there is an intrusion or there is no intrusion. Once again this is a significant simplification. We all know that intrusions are in many cases something that happen gradually, maybe starting with a session of portscanning and continuing with increasing degrees of penetration. Thus, it may not be evident exactly when the intrusion takes place. Further, intrusions are not always a single event, but the combined effect of two or several events that cooperate to accomplish an intrusion into the system. However, we feel that these complications in the modelling have to be coped with in future papers and only after the problems with the binary model have been solved.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have suggested a method to measure security that is based on an input-output-related system model for security and dependability. The model describes the attributes of these two concepts and how they interact with the system's environment. This leads us to the definition of two sets of security metrics: protective security metrics, related to the system input, and behavioural security metrics, related to the system output. We suggest that the protective security metric, i.e. integrity, is the one that is nearest to the essence of traditional security concept and could possibly be adopted as a new definition of security. We suggest two methods for the metrication of protective security. We also investigate existing and proposed metrics for behavioural security and for correctness.
